Post by elir on Jul 20, 2020 21:44:46 GMT
It seems like everyone but Clifton was wrong:
1. Victims misinterpreted or misidentified or were bullied/coerced into lying or misreporting
2.cops were all corrupt , every single one, and unfairly arrested this poor promising young man
3.DA was corrupt and or incompetent
4. judges at his trial and appeals for his rape and murder were corrupt or incompetent too
5. And to top it off , his defense was incompetent and /or mysteriously killed in an accident right before the hearing that would save him.
It’s possible , injustices do happen, it’s also possible that he was a sexual predator .
But they must be, otherwise how could they ignore all the arguments in his appeals.
I misstated that I had read the transcripts, it was the court decisions, sorry about that.
law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/997/660/382232/
law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/33/58/513437/
law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/270/860.html
law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/1993/?page=5
law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/33/58/513437/
law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/270/860.html
law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/1993/?page=5
Here is the relevant section from the decision by the California court-of-appeal in the rape case:
[6a] The only remaining element necessary to prove the offense was the intent of the defendant to have sexual intercourse by the use of force. (People v. Nye, supra, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 37; People v. House, 157 Cal. App. 2d 151, 155 [320 P.2d 542]; People v. Lutes, supra, 79 Cal. App. 2d 233, 236.)
The two were strangers. The defendant committed an aggravated assault upon the young girl, who wore only a two-piece bathing suit at the time. When he was interrupted in the course of his attack, he ran away, thus indicating consciousness of the commission of an offense; evidence which will be specified more fully in a later part of this opinion indicated that he was obsessed with a desire for sexual intercourse on the afternoon in question.
There is only one thing which might lead a jury, from the argumentative standpoint, to conclude that the defendant did not have the intention to commit rape during the assault, and that is the testimony given by the prosecutrix that, after he had assaulted her and had fallen to the ground with her, he suggested that they go under the bridge, and she then said, "Okay." Connie testified: "... then he told me, 'Let's go under the bridge' .... I said, 'Okay' .... I couldn't fight or do anything. ... I figured if I could get up and get my hands loose, or anything, I could run. ... we started getting up and this car pulled in. ... Well, he let go and he took off running. ... Back under the bridge. ... Well, I yelled, 'Help' and went this way around. ... Mr. Miller was coming there and--... I explained to him." [248 Cal. App. 2d 131]
It will be noted that Connie did not even then purport to give specific consent to sexual intercourse; she only appeared to consent to move under the bridge. She explained as a witness that she said, "Okay," so that she could get up from the position in which she was held prisoner and might have an opportunity to escape. When the opportunity did eventuate, she did escape. If she had gone under the bridge with the defendant, it does not follow that she would have consented to sexual intercourse.
[7] The transcript in this case does not contain the instructions given by the court, and, in such circumstances, we must assume that the jury was correctly and properly instructed. (People v. Danielson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 498, 508 [21 Cal. Rptr. 469]; People v. Crawford, 105 Cal. App. 2d 530, 537 [234 P.2d 181]; People v. Winters, 242 Cal. App. 2d 711, 716 [51 Cal. Rptr. 735].)
It must have been told that it could not find the defendant guilty of the crime charged unless it found that he had the intent to have sexual intercourse by force at some point during the assault. Aside from the somewhat ambiguous statement of Connie, "Okay," when he suggested going under the bridge, there is ample evidence to show resistance on the part of the prosecutrix, and these factors are important in connection with the issues as to whether the defendant intended to use force and whether she consented. (People v. Newlan, 173 Cal. App. 2d 579, 581 [343 P.2d 618]; People v. Stewart, 109 Cal. App. 2d 334, 343 [240 P.2d 704]; People v. Cline, 117 Cal. App. 181, 184 [3 P.2d 575].) [6b]
The victim tried to run when she first saw her attacker, but, as already noted, he grabbed her from behind and the two fell to the ground. Then, even though the defendant had his hand over her mouth, she yelled for help and only stopped shouting when he told her to shut up. As soon as she was permitted to stand up, she ran and yelled again for help. When she said, "Okay," at his request to go under the bridge, she was pinned to the ground and unable to get her hands loose, and she only indicated a willingness to go under the bridge in order to get free for a moment, hoping that she could escape. It is clearly indicated in People v. Norrington, 55 Cal. App. 103, 111 [202 P. 932], that when the victim intends sincere resistance, she should be permitted by the law to rely to some extent on feminine devices in the honest belief that she can best extricate herself from her predicament by fighting for time and remaining relatively calm and collected. We cannot say that the jury did not have ground to find the [248 Cal. App. 2d 132] presence of all of the elements necessary to constitute the offense.
